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Our study shows that the household production theory illuminates the behavior of
households in the allocation of time and consumption expenditures. Among the noteworthy
findings derived fiom our data, the various household non-market time allocations (consequently,
market labor supply) cannot be separated from consumption expenditures. An increase in market
wage rates for both young and elderly households reduces their time spent on household non-
market activities, such as child care, medical care, and listening to the radio and watching TV.
The high opportunity costs of waiting at the hospital clearly discourage working people from
visiting the hospital. These results show not a few similarities between the household non-market
time allocation in Japan and that to be found in the U.S.
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Human time is one of the most scarce resources. For understanding
the way this scarce resource is allocated to satisfy competing
human desires, we should look at the household's time allocation on
labor supply as merely one of various activities in conjunction
with household production (Becker 1965).'
Allowing for the fact that the traditional consumer demand
analysis puts great emphasis on the behavior of household
consumption expenditures, some recent empirical studiss are
• successful in bridging the gap between the consumption expenditure
studies and the household production studies (Barnett 1979,
Kooreman and Kapteyn 1987, and Biddle and Hamermesh 1990). Although
these studies provide useful observations about household tine
allocation,2 when the various household consumption expenditures
are analyzed, the household non-market tins activities are dealt
with as a single entity, i.e., leisure. On the other hand, when the
different non-market tine activities are studied, the consumption
expenditures are treated as an aggregate commodity.
To be more consistent with theory and consequently to
understand household economic activities more deeply than the
traditional demand study, household non-market time activities,
1 See Juster and Stafford (1991) for an excellent survey of
literature on the allocation of tine.
2 The results ares Barnett (1979) rejects the separability
between consumer's labor supply and consumption of market goods;
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) verify variations in the tine
allocation of household non-market activities in response to
changes in the real wage rate; and Huddle and Hamermesh (1990)
focus on a major household tine allocation, i.e., sleep, and
identify wage effects on sleeping and waking non-market tine for
men and on market and waking non-market time for women.—2—
rather than being aggregated as a single entity of leisure, need to
be simultaneously analyzed with household consumption expenditures
in a system of demand functions. This approach allows consistency
with standard economic hypotheses such as integrability,
separability,and homogeneity. With appropriate parameter
restrictions in the system, we are able to test for separability in
household non-market time activitiee.
Furthermore, the aforementioned empirical findings on
household time allocation should be verified for different
cultures. For example, in a country like Japan, people of different
ages and different gender seem to have distinct roles in the
household and are likely to behave differently in response to
changes in available econonic incentives.4 In addition to our
concern with international comparisons regarding the household
allocation of time, we focus epecifically on some of the social
issues currently being debated in Japan.
First, the rate of reproduction among young couples has
declined sharply in recent years; the total fertility rate, which
is the number of live births by a woman during her reproductive
period, was 4.40 in 1948, and 1.75 in 1980. The most recent
available figure is 1.53 in l990.How, then, do young Japanese
The excellent and comprehensive literature on a system of
consumer demand functions to review is Brown and Ljeaton (1972),
Diewert (1974, ch.3), Earten (1977, ch.2a), tat (1977, ch.2b),
Deaton and Muellbauer (1983), lDeaton (1986), and Blundell (1988).
The labor market in Japan still keeps the traditional
employment system although the Equal Employment Opportunity Law
went into effect in 1986 (Edwards 1988).
The Current Conditions of Women's Labor, Ministry of Labor,
1991, p. a87: "Fujin Roudou no Jitsujyo" in Japanese.—3—
households use their time after having chosen a smaller family size
ever than before? Second, it is often said, somewhat cynically,
that people must wait in a "3-hour" queue at the hospital to
receive a "3-minute" medical treatment. A long queue at the
hospital reflects a high shadow price of receiving medical care.
The high opportunity costs of waiting at the hospital will
discourage working people from visiting the hospital. We
consequently pose the following question- How responsive is
hospital visiting tine to changing economic incentives?
The organization of the subsequent sections is as follows: we
report the evidence from the survey of the allocation of tine over
the period from1976to 1986 in section II; our analytical
framework is presented in Section III; Section IV reports the
empirical findings; and finally Section V draws our conclusion of
this study.-4-
XI. Evidence from the Survey on Allocation of Tine
The cross-sectional data for cities with prefectural government on
tine spent on daily activities by males and females at different
age groups in 1976, 1981, and 1986 are to be found in Basic Survey
on Social Life, published by tbe Bureau of Statistics, Office of
the Prime Minister of Japan,
Of "Hours and Minutes per Day spent on Activities" in Tables
I-Cl) and (2), the reported time allocations are weekly averages of
time per day. Table I-Cl) shows the young households' (males and
females aged 25-39) allocation of time spent on work, sleep, child
care, medical care1 and Radio & TV (listening to the radio and
watching TV). The time activities of elderly households (males aged
65 and over, and females aged 60 and over) are listed in Table I-
(2)
The reasons for choosing these different age groups for
analysis in our study are that the former young age group has two
distinct characteristics: the members of this group are in the
middle of determining the size of their families; and most of the
males in that age group are very likely to be in the labor market.
On the other hand, the latter elderly group at the age of 65 years
old is likely to be retired from the labor market and to have
started receiving social security retirement benefits. Furthermore,
the payments for medical care of members of thie group at the
hospital are mostly covered by the public medical insurance for
elderly people.' Hence, we consider that these different age groups
'Tobe more specific, elderly people aged 65 through 69, who
are confined to bed, and those aged 70 or more are covered by this
health care program.—5-
are most likely to behave differently in response to changes in
• economic opportunities.
Since the figures reported in the Tables are self-
• explanatory, we mainly discuss the time allocations of males and
females aged 25-39 in TableI-Cl).The male market daily working
hours rose from 7 hours 22 minutes a day in 1976 to 7 hours 49
minutes in 198G.' Since these reported figures are weekly averages
of 7 days, if Japanese people hypothetically work the same amount
ofhours for 5 days a week similar to the western standard, their
working hours are nearly 10 hours a day on average.t
As regards sleeping hours, males"witha job" sleep shorter
hours than males "without a job", roughly by 30 minute a day.9 Such
a large difference, however, vanishes in the case of females. Males
sleep longer hours a day than females in Japan. As is to be
• expected in Japan, males, regardless of their attachment to the
labor markat, spend little time on child care, while females spend
a substantial amountoftheir tine on providing this care. Those
females "without a job" spend twice as much time or more each day
The most recent figures on the average monthly working hours
per worker in the manufacturing industry in 1990 are 178.2 hours
in firms with 30-99 workers; 174.8 hours in those with 100-499
workers; and 177.0 hours in those with 500 workers or more (White
Paper on Labor, Ministry of Labor, 1991, p. 287: "Roudou Hakueyo"
in Japanese). Note that the average monthly working hours are not
age and male specific, but induetry specific values. Hence, these
average monthly working hours are somewhat different from the
male's average daily working hours reported in the text.
9.6 percent of the firms with 30 or more workers have a
regular weekly 2-day off schedule in 1989, which cover 36.9 percent
of total employment in industries (The Current Conditions of
Women's Labor, Ministry of Labor, 1990, p. 594).
Middle and Hamermeeh (1990) report that "Time spent sleeping
is inversely related to both the wage and time spent in the labor
market (p. 941)."-6-
on child care than working females, who spend three hours or so on
average.
Concerning medical care, males "with a job" have much less
tins spent on medical care than males "without a job", while this
is not so for females.'1 To account for this difference in medical
care for males, two testable hypotheses may be offered: the first
one, for which we actually make a test in this study, is that males
in the labor market face high opportunity costs in visiting the
hospital and hence they visit less often as their economic
opportunities rise, while the income effects work toward more
medical care; end the second one is that males who are not in the
labor market are more likely to he ill, and the "not in the labor
force" nay be an indicator of poor health status. Hence those out
of the labor force spend more hours on medical care than those in
the market. In this second case, economic opportunities, e.g.,
their potential market wage rates, will exert little influence on
their choice of visiting the hospital. Finally, both males and
females "without a job" do spend much more time on Radio &TV
(i.e.,listening to the radio and watching TV) than those "witha
job". This phenomenon again seems to be indicative of the
difference in their economic opportunities. In sum, there exist
marked behavioral differences in the allocation of time between
young persons "with a job" and those "without a job" and also
between males and females of the sane age group. These obser-catione
10Sincea baby-sitter system is not popular in Japan. working
females are likely to be either sending their children to nurseries
or living with their parents, who take care of children.
'TheBasic Survey of Social Life does not include patients
in the hospital in the sample.-.7-
with respect to young peopleare almost duplicated forelderly
people as reported in Table I- (2).
Consequently, we Consider it
extremely valuable to clarify empirically towhat extent their time
allocationB are responsive tochanges in their economic




In a general presentation of thehousehold production theory,
consumers in a typical householdcombine their time inputs with
market goods (and services) to producehousehold non-market
commodities, z, j 1, .. ,n.A vector of the household commodities
directly enter the household utilityfunction and the household
maximizes the utility subject to itsincome and time constraints,
often named "full income" in the theory.Through this maximization
problem we should be able todefine a variety of forms for the
elasticities of demand for time allocation onvarious activities as
well as those for market goods.
Here, for the purpose of ourtheoretical presentation in a
comparative static analysis, we assumethe following simple two
non-market commodities model of thehousehold:






This general presentation; however,involves ungovernable
calculation and is almost intractable,though not impossible. For
example, even in a very simplemodel such as only two household
non-market commodities in the utilityfunction, i.e., U =U(Z1,Z),
where Z =;(xt1) for j 1 and 2, it seems a little bit
complicated that the elasticity oflabor supply with respect to
wage rate is the proportionof total time spent at non-market
activities minus a weighted averageof three elasticities of
substitutiofl the elasticity of substitutionbetween Z1 and Z and
those between the inputs in each Z1and Z2 (Daardorff and Stafford
1976, p. 679)-9-
where U is utility function of the female, f,and male, is,members
of an average household; Z (j =1,2) is a vector of market good
inputs; and t is the time input spent by personI (if, m) on
production of Z. In our specification1the male specializee in
production of Z, but it certainly does notmatter whether the male
or the female in the household specializesin production of Z2.
Simply, we assume that there is ahousehold non-market commodity
which requires only the time allocationof either one. Finally, we
assume that U1SU/8Z >0; t3U1/aZk>0it j•Ic; and =
au1/az,.c 0.
For the household non-market commodities,the following fixed-
proportions production functions with.inputsare assumed:
x1=aZ1 ; X2bZ1 t1aZ1and t+ tafiZ1
(4)
where a, b, a, and are positive coefficients.
The household maximizes the utility subjectto its full. income, F,
defined as:
Z1. PX1 +wT,,• wfT =wT+wT+VF , (5)
where P1 is a vector of the unit pricesof market goods in Z,; wj is
the earnings per unit of time for personi; T1 is a vector of total
tine inputs spent by person i atthe household non-market
activities, e.g., T, =t,
n=2: U is the total number of hours
available such as 24 hours a day;11 and V is non-laborhousehold
'Hence,T1,, -U-Tis the aount of time spent by personi
in the labor market.-10-
income.
Theabove maximization problem providesthe following
qualitative signs of ôln tj/D1nw, (i =f,m;and j1,2):
=— (ti,+ t2) et/ap+A(,r2m —ir29r—(112
—7TU22,
+(ff U —lr1f)U22.] 0' c 0
and similarly,
> 0;8t,/ôw —?;Otf]/ôw, >0;ôt_/5w =7;and8ç2/aw c 0,
(6)
whereDt1/Op' is the full-income effect ont,1; A is the marginal
utility of full income; Tj1isthe i-th person's shadow price of
21;
=U12/cq;U22. =U22/tV;and D is the determinant of the bordered
lfeseian, defined as:
0 -r -.ir2-v2
= —v1U11.U12. U2. <0, (7)
—'ir2tu1. U22.U22
_ffmu21U2 U22.,
wherer [(aP1/a) +; [(bP2/fl) + w] ,Ci=f,nØ; =
tI11/c;U1, =U21,;and weassume that U12.t721,- c 0, (i.e. U132
-IYU2c0), for U c 0.
From the above comparative staticanalysis, as female market
wagerate rises, the female, only whose timeinput with market
goods is required for the production ofZ1 spends less her time on
Z1, but spends more as male market wage rate rises.On the other
hand, when the time of the female and that ofthe male are perfect-11-
substitutes such as t3 +t,,,=Z,, the qualitative signs of female
wage effects on the femaleand male timespent on Z2 are ambiguous.
In terms of their labor supply to the market, the male wage effect
on the female labor supply is negative, while it is positive for
the male labor supply.14
To make the above household production model empirically
operational, we take an approach of the household cost function in
Deaton and Nuellbauer (1980) and estimate a system of demand
functions, in which a typical i-th cost share function is defined
as follows:
=a+ r1 log p +b1logy , (8)
whereS=jXj/ QJ•flPX+wT+WfT1),in which p is the unit price
of market good x;3 and y a PX + waT+w1T,)/CPI, in which
CP1 is the consumer price index.
The parameter restrictions in equation (8)area 1,
=> r1
=L b0 (thelinearly homogenous condition) and r11
(theSlutsky symmetry condition). We apply this econometric model
tothe data ontime allocations and consumption expenditures of
youngand elderly households in Japan.
14Thewage effect on the male (or female) labor supply tothe
market is obtained as follows: oT1,,/8w =8T/8w-8T1/ãw1;and in
the case of female labor supply, we have âT/ôw, =8T/äwf-eTf/owf
=_(ot1/aw+ôtfl/àwf)
15 example, as one of the S is concerned, the time cost
share spent by the female on a particular household non-market
activity, i.e., is defined as =w,t,1/(11PX+waTp+w4T)—12-
IV. EmpiricalFindings
In the estimation of our system of demand functions,we use pooled
time series data for cities with prefecturalgovernment in 1976,
1981, and 1986 on the allocation of time foryoung males and
females both aged 25-39 as well as for elderly malesaged 65 or
more and those females aged 60 or more.16 We focus on theirtine
allocations on sleep, child care, medical care, radio &TV, and all
other non-market time activities. These time dataare collected
from the Basic Survey on Social Life. In thesystem, we also
include five categories of household marketgoods and services
consumption: food, housing, clothing, medicalcare, and all
others.1' Among the total fifteen demand functions inthe system,
we delete the equation of the household consumptionexpenditure on
"All Others" to avoid the simgularity in the estimation.1!
Firet, in order to clarify whether the young (andelderly)
households behave or not as the traditionalconsumer demand
approach assumes such that the household consumptionexpenditures
are separable in their time allocations, we test for
separability
in the household non-market time activities(Blackorby, Primont,
and Russell 1977). We estimate the parameters of thesystem of
'Eachyear has 47 prefectural observations.
"Strictlyspeaking, in grouping numerous household goode and
services consumptions into different but appropriatecategories, we have to verify whether separability condition ismet or not for
each item. This is, however, beyond ourscope in the present study.
Therefore, we follow the conventional classifications in Annual
Report on the Family Income and Expendjture Survey by Statistics
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency in Japan.
Each share equation in the system has two yearly dummies and
seven regional dummies in addition to a vector of theprice
variables including the wage rates of males and females and income
variables.-13-
unconstrained demand functions and those of the system subject to
the separability restrictions. From the chi-square distribution
with sedegreesof freedom, i.e., x3(d.f.=58),we cannot accept
the separability restrictions at the significance level 0.01,
as reported in Table II.' Therefore, we consider that household
decisions on time allocation is jointly determined with household
decisions on consumption expenditures. To put it differently, the
household labor supply is not the result of a simple labor-leisure
choice, but the result of tine activities in conjunction with
household production. Hence, we support the findings of Barnett
(1979) with our own Japanese data.
Tables III-(l) and (2) report the estimates of the wage and
income elasticities of the time activities for the young
households.2° In order to have a general view of the wage and
income effects on their time activities, we begin with the
estimates of "All Households' of young males and females, as shown
under(A) in Table Ill-Cl) .
Withrespect tothe male wage effect, on his time
allocations,as his market wags rate rises, a typical Japanese
working male aged between 25 and 39 years old tends to increase his
hours spent sleeping (i.e., "Sleep" in Table) and working in the
'Fordata on "Both (male and female) in the Labor Market" in
Table II, we use the data of working males of a given age group
with those of working females of the same age group as a working
couple. Similarly, we use data for those of "Only Male in the Labor
Market" and "Neither in the Labor Market."
'°seeBinswanger (1974) for the calculations of the
elasticities and standard errors.
LtHere,for the purpose of our present study we report only
the empirical results of the household allocation of time. Those on
the consumption expenditures are available on request.-14-
labor market (i.e., "Labor Supply" in Table) but to reduce his
hours spent on the other household non-market activities including
"Medical Care".22 The male wage effects on female time activities
are positive regarding the hours of her sleeping and listening to
the radio and watching TV (i.e., "Radio & TV" in Table) but
negative regarding all her other time activities including her
labor supply." As regards the effects of Wtmj.p as the wage rate
rises, the male enjoys more hours of sleeping, medical care, and
listening to the radio and watching TV, while the female works more
in the labor market. Another point concerning young households is
that wage effects on "Child Care" for both males and females are
negative, so we can conclude that they tend to choose to have less
number of children as their market opportunities improve. With
respect to income effects, as the household income rises, the young
households spend more hours on household non-market time
activities, i.e., producing more household non-market cocwnodities,
but reduces their hours of work in the market.
Now we will highlight and discuss in a little more detail the
important results concerning young working households, as reported
in Tables III- (1) and (2) .'Asregards "Both in the Labor Market"
under (B) in Table III- (1), the male (or female) wage effect on his
"Althoughnot reported in Table III- Cl), the estimate of wage
elasticity of "male's all other non-market time activities" is
negative, -0.746.
"Thewage elasticity on "female's all other non-market time
activities" is -0.188.
24Sincethere are only a few qualitative differences in the
empirical results between "Both in the Labor Market" as reported
under (B) in Table III-(l) and "Only Male in the Labor Market"
under (C) in Table flI-(2), we focus only on those results of the
former.-15-
(or her) sleeping is positive and statistically significant in
contrast to the U.S. experience, where the effects are negative
(Biddle and Hamermesh 1990) 2S The positive estimates for Japanese
working males and females are, however, not a puzzling result.
Since our data on tine allocation are weekly averages of tine per
day, a working couple may make up for a lack of weekdays' sleeping
hours by sleeping more over the weekend."
Also, as the market wage rates increase, both males and
females increase their working hours: the estimated labor eupply
elasticity for males is 0.369 and that for females is O.63l.'
These values are comparable with those reported by the previous
studies (Shinada and Higtchi 1985 and Yamada, et al, 1987). The
cross wage effects are negative for both males and females. That
is, a rise in the partner's market wage encourages his (or her)
withdrawal from the labor market. The estimated owiiwageandincome
elasticities of female labor supply are nearly twice as large as
' The estimated ownwageelasticity of sleeping for males is
0.153, while the value is 0.147 for females: a ten-percent rise in
male wage rate increases his average sleeping time by about I
minutes a day (10 x 0.00153 x 463 minutes (see, in Table I-Cl),
that a typical male aged 25-39 9flth a Job sleeps 7:43, i.e., 463
minutes a day, in 1966))
" In Japanese cartoons, it is very coon to have a character
of a prime age working male who has no energy left with himself on
a weekend due to his exceseive work during weekdays, e.g., daily
overtime work till nearly midnight. He in the cartoon loves
sleeping at home on the weekend, although his wife and children are
expecting that he would take his family out such as a driving,
shopping, and so forth. They always wait a long timel This cynicism
is not totally false.
1
27 These labor supply elasticities are not directly obtained
from the estimated coefficients in the system of demand functions,
since the share equations of male and female labor supply are
excluded from the system by theory. The elasticities are simply a
weighted average of the own wage elasticities of non-market
activities.-16-
those for males. This is probably because the female has more
alternatives in allocating her tine than does her husband, since a
married woman in Japan normally specializes in household production
and is consequently less attached to the labor market than her
spouse.
Increases in hours of sleeping and labor supply for both males
and females due to an increase in their market wage rates reduce
their household non-market activities such as "Child Care",
"Medical Care", and "Radio & TV". These findings are congruent with
those drawn in the case of two-earner U.S. households by Koorenan
and Kapteyn (1987). With respect to the "Child Care", the higher
the opportunity cost to raise children for a typical working young
couple the smaller will be the size of family members chosen by the
household. Contrary to the negative wage effects on child care, a
rise in household income encourages them to spare more time for
child care. That is, an increase in household income raises the
number of children (and/or mayhe the quality of children too) in
the household.2"
With our study of the wage effect on the tine allocation on
medical care, the result is negative (as is to be expected for both
21 The total amount of parents' time, T, spent on children in
a typical household is t x N, where t is the average time spent on
each child by the parents and N is the number of children in the
household. Then, ôln T,/öln Income =ôlntJOln Income .'. N/8ln
Income. From our empirical result, we know öln T/8ln Income > .
Therefore,if t is fixed, the number of children rises as the
household income increases. On the other hand, if N is fixed, the
"quality (given the condition that the parents' time is superior to
any other substitutes)" of child will increase as the income rises.
In realty, a mixture of the positive income effects seem to be held
on both t and N.-17-
working males and fenales), but statistically insignificant." A
one-percent rise in male wage rate reduces his time spent on
medical care, e.g., waiting at the hospital, by about 3 percent
(i.e., -3.009 for male "Medical Care" under W1 and -2.963 for
female "Medical Care" under W±mi.) Putting it differently, a
typical working male reducee his time spent on hospital visite by
about 6 minutes a week in reeponee to a ten-percent increase in his
wage rate [7 days a week x 10 x -0.03009 x 3 minutes spent on
"Medical Care" by males "with a job" in 1986 in Table I-Cl)].
Although the value itself is small, this seems to be indicative of
one of the reasone why prime age working males andfemalesare
rarely to be found waiting their turns in the busy lobbies of
hospitals all day long.
Now we will discuss the empirical results on elderly
households, as reported in Tables IV-(l) and (2). About the "All
Households" under (A) in Table IV-(l), the W,_1 effect is positive
on male "labor supply" and a rise in the wage rate encourages his
spouse to take more "Sleep' and "Child Care" of, presumably, their
grand-children. But, for the W_,_1. effect which is positive on her
market labor supply, the male is not so helpful for caring grand-
children. In other words, when elderly people are not responsible
for taking care of their grand-children, as their market economic
opportunities rise, they seem not to retire early from the labor
market.
The most striking findings for working elderly males, as shown
"Thiswage effect on males is negative and statistically
significant for the case of "All Households" reported under (A) in
Table XII- (1).-18-
under (B) in Table IV-{l) and under (C) in Table IV-(2), are that
the wage effects on their time spent on "Sleep", "Child Care",
"Medical Care", and "Radio & IV" are all negative and statistically
significant)C The negative wage effect on "Medical Care" and the
positive effect on "Labor Supply" for working elderly males clearly
indicates that their condition of good health postpones their
retirement from the labor market, in sharp contrast to the positive
wage effect on "Medical Care" for the "Neither one in the Labor
Market" household as reported under CD) in Table IV-(2).3' As for
the Wf,• effects on her household non-market time activities, a
general impression is that the negative wage effects dominate, but
that they are statistically much weaker in significance than with
the male counterparts,
In sum, our empirical findings show that household decisions
on the allocation of time is not independent of household decisions
on consumption expenditures. An increase in wage rates stimulates
the market labor supply for both young and elderly people, but
generally reduces their non-market time activities. On the other
hand, household income has dominant positive effects on the time
allocations on sleeping, child care, medical care, and listening to
the radio and watching TV.
These qualitative results are similar to those for working
young males except for the effect on "Sleep", but the statistical
results for working young males are much weaker than those with
working elderly males,
'Asoften done in the literature of labor economics, A wage
equation for non-participants in the labor market should be
estimated in an appropriate manner. Since we are not successful in
collecting the relevant variables for the equation, we instead use
the industry average wage rates for the non-participants.
Therefore, our results for them are only suggestive.-19-
V. Conclusions and Implications
In this study, by using the pooled time series data in 1976, 1981,
and 1986, we analyze the allocation of time of young (aged 25-39)
and elderly (aged 65 or more) households in Japan. We estimate a
system of demand functions, in which the equations of household
non-market time activities are simultaneously estimated with those
of household consumption expenditures.
Among the noteworthy findings derived from our data, first of
all, in our test for separability in the household time allocation,
we cannot accept the separability restrictions. Hance, as has
already been suggested by some U.S. data, our Japanese data show
that household non-market time l1ocations (consequently, its
market labor supply)are not separable from consumption
expenditures.
Secondly, an increase in ths market wage rates for both young
and elderly households reduces their time spent on the household
non-market activities such as child care, medical care, and
listening to the radio and watching TV. We consider one reason why
young working couples have smaller families in recent years to be
bound up with the improvements in their economic opportunities in
the labor market. Since fewer children are born and fewer working
people are now supporting currently retired people than in the
past, and since these trends will continue in the near future,
raising the retirement age reconmiendsd by the Japanese government
would encourage people to work longer and thus would reduce the
ratio of retired to working ags people.
Thirdly, as hypothesized, the high opportunity costs of
waiting at the hospital clearly discourage working people from-20-
visiting the hospital. Requiring firmsto havetheir ownclinics
and encouraging hospitals to make appointments for patients would
reduce waiting time.
As a concluding remark, our study shows that the household
production theory iliwninates the behavior of households in the
allocation of time and consumption expenditures. The results of our
empirical model based on the theory show not a few similarities
between the forms of household behavior in different cultures,
e.g., the U.S. and Japan.-21-
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TABLE I-(l)
Hours and Minutes per Day spent on Activities


































Note: Values in Table should read in Hours:Minutes, e.g., 7:22 =7
hours and 22 minutes a day. Medical care implies medical
examination and treatment at clinics and hospitals. Child Care
includes House Keeping, and Radio & TV includes time spent on
reading newspapers and magazines.
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister in
Japan, Basic Survey on Social Life -WholeJapan : Time Spent on

















Work 6:02 0:24 5:36 0:13 5:24 0:06
Sleep 7:43 7:50 7:33 7:41 724 7:28
Child Care 3:07 6:19 3:06 6:26 3:17 7:02
Medical Care 0:06 0:12 0:04 0:07 0:04 0:09
Radio & TV 1:51 2:35 1:36 2:16 1:37 2:11-25-
TABLE 1-12)


































Note: Values in Table should read in Hours:Minutes, e.g., 5:36 a5
hours and 36 minutes a day. Medical care implies medical
exsminatjon and treatment at clinics and hospitsls. Child Cars
includes House Keeping, andRadio& TV includes tine spent on
reading newspapers and magazines.
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister in
Japsn,BasicSurvey on Social Life -WholeJapan : Tine Spent on
Activities, 1976 (pp. 18-23), 1981 (pp. 26-43), and 1986 (pp. 26-
43)
MalesAced 65 and Over
1975 1981 1986
Persons Persons Persons
With Without With WithoutWith Without




































Females Aced SO and Over-26-
TABLEXI
Testfor Separability in the Household Tine Allocation
A Household of Male and Female aged 25-39




All Households 9467.58 9418-93 97.30
Both in the
Labor Market 9564.35 9502.45 123.78'
Only Male in the
Labor Market 9673.96 9613.69 120.54
A Household of Male aced 65 and over and
Female aged 60 and over




All Households 8358.94 8282.50 152.88'
Both in the
Labor Market 7806.50 7730.90 151.20'
Only Male in the
Labor Market 8175.28 8103.18 144.20'
Neither one in
the Labor Market 8203.73 8130.40 146.66'
a: significant at the 1% level.
Note: The degrees of freedom are xC58).-27-
TABLEIfl-(l)
Estimates of Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Household of Male and Female aged 25-39
All Households
Allocation with Respect to Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income of time Wnale wfemale Income
Male Female
Sleep 0.172' 0.353' 0.002 Sleep 0.073 0.1350.220
(0.040) (0.029) (0.059) (0.159) (0.116) (0.234)
Child—1.314 _2,081b 3742b Child-0.003 -1.080' 2.015
Care (1.146) (0.838) (1.686) Care(0.246) (0.179) (0.361)
Medical 4.47l' 0.8722.787 Medical -7.041' -1.154 7.780'
Care (2.649) (1.937) (3.898) Care(1.886) (1.379) 12.775)
Radio-0.038 0.1960.406 •Radio 0.182 _0.55,b 1.136'
&TV(0.251) (0.184) (0.369) &TV(0.298) (0.218) (0.439)
Labor 0.509' -0.244' -1.602' Labor -0.266 1.991' -6.393'
Supply (0.010) (0.005) (0.021) Supply (0.260) (0.139) (0.564)
at significant at the 1% level.
1: significant at the 5% level.
c: significant at the 10% level.
Notet The own wage elasticity is defined as Ei,i =(r1/s1).i.s1-l;the
cross wage elasticity is as ci.j =(rj1/e)+sj;and income elasticity
is as = All the elasticities are evaluated at
the sample means. 1 is the total expenditure ehare of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parentheses.-28-
TABLEIII-(2)
Estimatesof Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Household of Male and Female aged 25-39
Both in the Labor Market
Allocation With Respect to Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income of time Wmale Wfemale Income
Male
Sleep 0.1531 0.293' 0.070 sleep0137b0.147'0.002
(0.039) (0.028) (0.058) (0.056) (0. 040) (0.083)
Child-1.362 -2.008' 3684bChild-0.277 -1.217' l.992
Care(1.080) (0.772) (1.603) Care(0.323) (0.231) (0.479)
Medical -3.009 -0.7092.218 Medical _7,417b-2.96310165b
Care(2.554) (1.827) (3.792) Care(3.109) (2.224) (4.615)
Radio-0.030 0.2670.277 Radio0.174 -0.330 0,973b
&TV(0.249) (0.178) (0.370) & TV(0.319) (0.220) (0.474)
Labor 0.369' -0.218' -1,467' Labor -0.039 0.631' -2.606'
Supply (0.009) (0.004) (0.019) Supply (0.042) (0.021) (0.092)
a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
c: significant at the 10% level.
Note: The own wage elasticity is defined as ei,1 ={r/s1)+s-l;the
cross wage elasticity is as fl,J =(rjj/sj)+sj;and income elasticity
is as = +1. All the elasticities areevaluated at
thesample means. S is the total expenditure share of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parentheses.-29-
TABLEflI-(3)
Estimates of Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Household oLMale and Female aged 25-39
Only Male in the Labor Market
AllocationWith Respect to Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income of time Wmale Wfeaale Income
Male Female
Sleep 0.154' 0.363' 0.032 Sleep0.1050.161' 0.027
(0.043) (0.038) (0-078) (0.067) (0.059) (0.121)
Child 2.O52' 3074' 5.751' Child 0.458' -0.332 0.495
Care(1.170) (1.028) (2.108) Care(0.256) (0.225) (0.461)
Medical -2.833 —0.8812.300 Medical _5g25b-0.3485.626
Care (2.797) (2.458) (5.039) Care (2.403) (2.112) (4.329)
Radio -0.176 0.1090.742 Radio 0.964' 0.347 -1.006
&TV(0.271) (0.238) (0.488) &TV (0.363) (0.319) (0.654)
Labor0.497' -0.053' -1.910'
Supply (0.011) (0.008) (0,034)
a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
c:significant at the 10% level.
Note: The own wage elasticity is defined as = (r11/sjts-l; the
cross wage elasticity is as i4 a(r/s)+s;and income elasticity
is as ij1,,,,,=(b11,,,js4).l. All the elasticities are evaluated at
the sample means. S is the total expenditure share of i-th input,
The standard errors are in parentheses.-30-
TABLE IV-(1)
Estimates of Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time




a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
c significant at the 10% level.
Note: The own wage elasticity is defined as €i,i =(r11/s)+s1-lthe
cross wage elasticity ie as (r1/s)+s;and income elasticity
is as = (b1,,,/s)+l.All the elasticities are evaluated at
the sample means. S is the total expenditure share of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parentheses.
Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income
AllocationWith Reepect to

























































(0.511)a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
ct significant at the 10% level.
Notet The ownwageelasticity is defined as E±,i =(r1/s1)-e-s1-l;the
cross wage elasticity is as Ei,j=(rjj/sj)+sj; andincomeelasticity
is as = All the elasticities are evaluated at
the sample means. S is the total expenditure share of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parentheses.
-31-
TABLEIv-(2)
Estimatesof Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Eousehold of Male aced 65 and over and Female aged 60 and over
Both in the Laborillarket
Allocation With Respect to
of time Wmale Wfemale Income
Sleep
AllocationWith Respect to .























































Estimates of Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Household of Male aged 65 and over and Female aged 60 and over
Only Male in the Labor Market
..AllocationWith Respect to Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income of time Wmale Wfemale Income
Male Female
Sleep-0.259' 0.097 0.874' Sleep 0.257' 0.0570291'
(0.048) (0.060) (0.097) (0.043) (0.053) (0.086)
Child_l.990b -1.001 2.952' Child 0•301b-0.0150.173
Care(0.873) (1.087) (1.764) Care(0.152) (0.190) (0.308)
Medical _l.960t -1.835 3.805 Medical -0.614 -0.970 2.787'
Care(1.154) (1.437) (2.333) Care(0.475) (0.591) (0.960)
Radio -0.698' -0.188l.3l6 Radio0.140 —0.069 0.580'
& TV (0.144) (0.179) (0.290) & TV (0.104) (0.129) (0.210)
Labor 1.221' 0.162' -3.582'
supply (0.011) (0.018) (0.047)
a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
c: significant at the 10% level.
Note: The own wage elasticity is defined as ei,i =(r1/e)+s1-1;the
cross wage elasticity is as ci, =(rjj/sj)+s;and income elasticity
is as =(h11,/e1)+1.All the elasticities are evaluated at
the sample means. s1isthe total expenditure share of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parenthesee.-33-
TABLElv-(4)
Estimatesof Wage and Income Elasticities of the Allocation of Time
A Household of Male aged 65 and over and Female aged 60 and over
Neither one in the Labor Market
Allocation With Respect to Allocation With Respect to
of timeWmale Wfemale Income of tine Wmale Wfemale Income
Female
Sleep -0.2210.16]P 0.7l3 Sleep 0.158' -0.072 0.573
(0.077) (0.061) (0.143) (0.058) (0.061) (0.108)
Child _1,664b-0.3221.972 Child 0.325 -0.005 0.205
Care (0.687) (0.726) (1.286) Care(0.205) (0.217) (0.384)
Medical 0.2990.389 0.021 Medical _1•459b_1515b 4.210'
Care(0.925) (0.977) (1,733) Care (0.636) (0.672) (1.191)
Radio -0.0330.398' 0.353 Radio-0.085 -0.281' 1.073'
& TV(0.213) (0.225) (0.399) & TV(0.138) (0.146) (0.258)
a: significant at the 1% level.
b: significant at the 5% level.
ct significant at the 10% level.
Note: The own wage elasticity is defined as fl,i(r/s)+s-l; the
cross wage elasticity is as ci,j =(r1/s)-is1;amd income elasticity
is as•,,,_= (b1,,,_/s)+l.All the elasticities are evaluated at
the saatple means. S is the total expenditure share of i-th input.
The standard errors are in parentheses.